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SUMMARY
This report argues that public health surveillance for emerging diseases and
preparedness for biological terrorism are strongly related. It first surveys possible
scales of bioterrorist attacks and the extent to which these have proven or may prove
difficult to distinguish from outbreaks of emerging diseases. Building on these
examples, the report makes recommendations for how the United States could better
prepare to meet the threat of biological terrorism. These recommendations range over
domestic and international improvements in public health surveillance, the need for
improved coordination within the U.S. government, and plausible verification
measures for the Biological Weapons Convention.
Many potential biological agents have incubation delay times within infected
individuals that are long when compared to contemporary national and international
travel times. This endows these agents with special advantages as terrorist weapons
compared to other potential means of mass destruction. The possibility of contagion
(in the case of agents such as smallpox) is a further terror advantage. These aspects of
biological agents emphasize the importance of a strategy of public health surveillance
for incidents of bioterrorism—a strategy that is inapplicable to the case of chemical
or nuclear attacks. For many plausible biological attacks, those at the “sharp end of
the spear” Will be physicians in hospitals, clinics, and family practice, rather than
quick-response teams.
Preparing for bioterrorism requires improving the sensitivity and “connectivity” of
public health surveillance systems within the United States and overseas. Domestically,
physicians and other health-care workers must be given the training needed to
recognize or at least suspect unusual diseases. The ability to check these suspicions
quickly at the state, regional, and national levels must be available. Within the U.S.
government, coordination between public health, law enforcement, and intelligence
agencies should be strengthened. Internationally, the United States should work with
foreign governmental, multilateral, and non-governmental organizations to improve
global surveillance for suspicious outbreaks. The right for international investigations
of such outbreaks should be negotiated as a verification measure to the Biological
Weapons Convention.
This report makes specific recommendations in each of these areas. An appropriate
national security response to the threat of biological terrorism should build directly
upon the improved public health surveillance needed to combat the environmental
threat of emerging diseases. In this context, responsibility for national security
extends throughout society, from primary care physicians and pathologists at local
hospitals and clinics, to state and national health laboratories and officials, and to
public health surveillance networks overseas. These responsibilities need to be
matched with appropriate resources. Public health and national security merge in
the realm of emerging diseases and biological terrorism.
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EMERGING DISEASES AND
NATIONAL SECURITY
Since the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy community has debated the role of
environmental issues in national security. Just as the oil shocks of the s demonstrated
that traditional defense-oriented notions of security had to be broadened to include
economic issues,1 so some now argue that certain environmental issues should be
included as well.2,3 But not all environmental threats may be cogently and usefully
framed as security issues. Such threats must be sufficiently understood scientifically
for proposed solutions to be credible, and they also must be of enough potential
consequence to justify the commitment of resources and the attention of senior
policy makers. Few environmental threats have been perceived across the political
spectrum as satisfying both these requirements, and few have achieved broad
recognition as security issues.
Emerging infectious disease may provide the strongest example of an environmental
challenge that poses a clear threat to national security. Emerging infections undermine
the societies of the most disease-stricken countries, readily cross international borders,
and consequently directly threaten the health of people throughout the world. The
- Spanish influenza pandemic killed twenty to twenty-five million people
worldwide, including one-half million Americans.4 The human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV), which infects over  percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa,5
remains one of the ten leading causes of death in the United States.6 Even definitions
of national security restricted to defense and economics alone must acknowledge the
relevance of epidemics of this magnitude and the importance of preventing future
outbreaks. Moreover, there is the possibility that a major outbreak of disease could
originate not from natural causes, or unintended consequences of human behavior,
but rather as a result of deliberate biological attack.
Diseases that enter the human population from some natural reservoir are said to
have “emerged.” Diseases emerge for many, often poorly understood, reasons.7,8,9
Mad cow disease most likely emerged when humans ate infected cattle products.10
The horrific Ebola virus lives in an unidentified animal or insect host and only now
and then jumps to humans, for reasons that remain largely unknown.11 The fatal
hantavirus outbreak in the American Southwest in  was traced back to deer mice
whose population had exploded due to local climate change: food sources had been
unusually abundant that year because of record precipitation.12 In other cases, such as
that of tuberculosis in the United States, diseases once thought to be under control
developed resistance to known antibiotics and experienced a resurgence.13 Epidemic
diphtheria returned to Eastern Europe as vaccination programs weakened, the pool
of immunologically compromised individuals in major cities expanded, and infected
travelers spread the disease.14
Even excluding HIV/AIDS (itself a recently emerged disease), the death rate from
infectious diseases rose by  percent in the United States between  and .9
It is anticipated that as more organisms develop resistance to over-prescribed
antibiotics,15,16,17 as the growing human population increases its inroads into tropical
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forests,18 as cities in the developing world become more crowded and sanitation
ever more problematic,13 and as greater numbers of people travel or flee across
international borders,9,13 more “new” diseases will appear or take hold in the
human population.4,7,8,9,13,19
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THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
As was true with emerging disease, the threat of biological terrorism was present
throughout the Cold War, but concern over this threat has since escalated. During
the Cold War, the greatest biological threat faced by the United States was posed by
the Soviet Union, and that threat seemed most likely to be manifested in the event of
overt war rather than in acts of terrorism. Nations currently regarded as rogue states
were less likely during the Cold War to have the freedom of action to launch terrorist
attacks using weapons of mass destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the current overwhelming conventional military superiority of the United States,
weapons of mass destruction might now be seen by these nations as equalizers, to
be brandished or used in terrorism or unconventional warfare.20,21
Moreover, the human and technical resources needed for a biological weapons
program are spreading throughout the world. While it may still be true that most
developing countries lack the microbiological capacity needed to develop biological
warfare agents,22 eight or more developing nations have been implicated in
developing an offensive biological warfare capability.23 It has been alleged by a
prominent Russian defector that Russian scientists have used genetic engineering to
produce antibiotic-resistant strains of a number of disease organisms.24 Some of this
research has been published in the open literature, so it is available for application by
nations developing their own biotechnology industries. Worse yet is the possibility
that some Russian researchers may market their personal expertise to other nations.25
The world recently learned of the Aum Shinrikyo, a multinational terrorist group
intent on the development and use of an array of weapons of mass destruction.
Biological and chemical agents are now demonstrably within the technical expertise
of such groups, and even primitive and inefficient versions of these weapons could
have devastating economic or terror impacts. With the independent bombing attacks
at the World Trade Center in New York in  and the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City in , the release of sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway system
in  by the Aum Shinrikyo, and that group’s attempts to attack Tokyo using
anthrax and botulism,26,27 large-scale terrorist attacks on civilian populations using
weapons of mass destruction no longer seem in the realm of the fantastic. At their
worst, the New York, Oklahoma City, and Tokyo attacks may represent the crossing
of a grim threshold,28 weakening long-standing taboos and increasing the likelihood
of analogous attacks in the future.
BIOTERRORISM: A UNIQUE THREAT?
Biological weapons differ fundamentally from other weapons of mass destruction.
Whereas nuclear and chemical weapons cause immediate casualties, biological agents
require hours to days or even weeks of incubation before they cause fatalities.
(Exposure to some biologically derived toxins, as opposed to living organisms which
incubate inside the body, could exhibit timescales more similar to those of chemical
weapons—but toxins are, in effect, biologically derived chemical weapons.) Barring a
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terrorist announcement or fortuitous discovery, a biological attack will first become
known hours or days after its execution, when its victims begin to appear at doctors’
offices and hospital emergency rooms. Sufficiently subtle biological terrorist attacks
might go unrecognized, or remain undetected, for long periods of time. Terrorism
involving the dispersal of radiological materials could, in this respect, share some
similarities with biological agents.
Desirable characteristics for biological agents for military use include minimal
contagiousness (as with Bacillus anthracis, the sporulating bacterium that causes
anthrax) to ensure that the disease cannot produce an uncontrolled epidemic that
could boomerang and infect the attacker’s forces or population.23 For a terrorist
attack, however, contagiousness (communicability) might well be viewed as an asset.
Contagious agents may spread the disease far beyond the initially exposed population.
For example, the two- to three-day incubation period for plague (Yersinia pestis) is
long enough to allow victims of an attack to travel by air between virtually any city in
the world and any city in the United States before falling seriously ill — especially so
if the organisms were released in the departure gates area of a major international
airport.
The smallpox virus has an incubation time of seven to seventeen days. The discontinuation
of routine vaccination, the contagiousness of the disease (including secondary
transmission from infected individuals who might themselves never manifest the
disease), and the unknown extent of possible clandestine stockpiles29 make smallpox
seem an especially attractive agent of bioterrorism. It has been reported that North
Korea may retain smallpox cultures for use as a biological weapon.30
Consider the outcome of one infected individual visiting New York City. In  an
American businessman arrived from Mexico with fever, headache, and rash, and then
spent several hours sightseeing. His illness turned out to be smallpox, and he died
nine days later after having infected twelve others, of whom two died. Public health
officials viewed the potential for transmission to be so serious (despite the fact that
Americans at that time were routinely vaccinated against smallpox) that over six
million people in New York City were vaccinated within a month.31 In contrast to
, Americans have not been routinely vaccinated against smallpox since .32
The federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) currently maintains
over twelve million doses of vaccine in storage.33
In a more recent case, in  a pilgrim returned to Yugoslavia from Iraq infected
with smallpox. To contain the resulting outbreak, over ten thousand people were
quarantined, and twenty million were vaccinated in less than two weeks.34
The incubation delay endows biological agents with advantages as terrorist weapons
that nuclear or chemical weapons lack. The possibility of contagion (in the case of
some agents such as smallpox), and resulting fear, is a further terror advantage. These
aspects of biological agents emphasize the importance of a strategy of public health
surveillance for incidents of bioterrorism — a strategy that is inapplicable to the cases
of chemical or nuclear attacks. The threats posed by biological weapons must be
thought about and addressed in a very different way.
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Barring a terrorist announcement or an interruption of an attack while underway,
traditional “first responders” (fire, police, paramedics) or quick-response teams with
specialized equipment and training will not be among those initially recognizing and
responding to a biological attack. As described below, biological terrorist attacks
conducted by followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh35 in  and attempted by
members of the Aum Shinrikyo26,27 in the early s were accompanied by no
announcements and remained unrecognized while in progress. As these examples
illustrate, recognition and response to a successful biological attack, domestically or
abroad, will most likely depend upon the sensitivity and connectivity of the existing
public health system.
Sensitivity refers to how likely it is that a given presentation of a disease will be
recognized by a physician or other health-care worker as being out of the ordinary.
Connectivity refers to how quickly and accurately information about a case gets passed
“vertically” from the clinical level up to state, national, or international authorities,
and “horizontally” within these levels.
Within the United States, surveillance for infectious diseases is a largely passive
process.13 Each state has its own requirements for the reporting of specific diseases
by physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers. Local or state health
departments are supposed to be notified by physicians or laboratories if a patient is
diagnosed with a disease defined as reportable by that state. At the national level,
the CDC collaborates with the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists in
maintaining a list of national notifiable diseases. Individual states’ requirements for
notifiable diseases typically parallel this list. Through the National Notifiable
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), states voluntarily report weekly to the
CDC on the incidence of some fifty diseases. These diseases include several of
potential interest to bioterrorists, such as anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, and plague.
Reporting is mandatory for a small number of diseases requiring quarantine, such
as suspected smallpox, infectious tuberculosis, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.
Outbreaks of diseases not on the national notifiable diseases list may remain
undetected until an outbreak is well under way. The CDC analyzes the data it
receives and reports on it in its Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.
A second type of national disease surveillance by the CDC involves the use of
“sentinel” hospitals.19 In this case, no attempt is made to gather comprehensive
national data. Rather, the National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance (NNIS)
system gathers data voluntarily provided by  (as of ) hospitals. (Nosocomial
infections are infections acquired while a patient is hospitalized.) Incidence of
infections in the participating hospitals may be used to estimate the national
incidence of nosocomial infections. In addition to the NNDSS and the NNIS
system, the CDC also engages in pilot projects with certain states, in key U.S. cities,
or with individual “sentinel” physicians, to gather data on the incidence and
characteristics of other diseases or disease outbreaks.13
A survey of the possible scales of terrorist attacks and the extent to which these have
proven or may prove difficult to distinguish from outbreaks of infectious diseases,
will make it clear that improving surveillance for biological terrorism must build
directly upon existing public health surveillance systems. As discussed below, this
requirement has specific implications for the steps that should be taken to prepare
for bioterrorism.
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POSSIBLE SCALES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
An examination of biological terrorism episodes illustrates the range of threats for
which we must prepare. The most dramatic biological threat is a major terrorist
attack against an urban center, using an efficient mechanism for the dispersal of the
biological agent. In , the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that
 kg of aerosolized (converted to respirable particles in the  to  micron size range)
Bacillus anthracis spores dispensed by an airplane upwind of a major city could kill
hundreds of thousands to millions of people.36 A different scenario estimates that the
number of deaths resulting from an anthrax aerosol dispersed from a boat sailing
upwind from New York City could be over , people.37 While no such major
biological attack has yet succeeded, this decade has seen the release of sarin nerve
agent in the Tokyo metro system in  by the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult (killing
eleven people, with over , injured, of whom some  required hospitalization).
Moreover, the Aum repeatedly—at least nine times— attempted biological attacks
on Tokyo city as well as nearby U.S. naval installations.27 While the failure of the
Aum’s attacks suggests that acquiring and successfully weaponizing an effective
biological agent remains challenging, large-scale attacks on civilian urban populations
nevertheless are clearly no longer in the realm of the fantastic.
A large-scale attack against an urban center using biological agents would be the
manifestation of biological terrorism having the most in common with a chemical or
nuclear attack. Even for a massive urban biological attack, however, public health
surveillance could be critical to minimizing deaths and casualties, as well as economic
costs. A recent study38 examined expected deaths and economic impact for scenarios
involving three different biological agents (Bacillus anthracis, Brucella melitensis, and
Francisella tularensis) released as aerosols in a terrorist attack on a major city. The
timescales required for effective intervention vary according to the agent. First,
consider the anthrax case as an example. The study found that intervention (taken to
be  percent effective administration of antibiotics and vaccinations) within one
day after the attack could keep deaths to below ,, as opposed to over , if
intervention occurred five or more days later, and could save $ billion to $ billion.
At the other extreme in incubation timescales, for the case of brucellosis, intervention
within the first two weeks after the attack would reduce deaths to about 
compared with over  if intervention did not take place until after two months.
Effective intervention would only be possible if family physicians and emergency
room personnel recognized as early as possible during an outbreak that an anomalous
situation existed, and if these concerns were effectively passed to state and national
health authorities for rapid diagnosis and response.
These same public health capabilities are those necessary to detect more subtle attacks
as well. One can envision terrorists introducing a disease into the United States in
such a way that no easily recognizable outbreak occurs, or so that no outbreak is
noticed until the disease is well under way. Such a masked attack, followed by a
credible terrorist announcement, could have an impact far out of proportion to
the deaths that actually resulted.
It has sometimes been asserted that there is an outstanding puzzle (perhaps of a
psychological nature) to be solved regarding why terrorists have so far been deterred
from biological attacks.39,40 In light of the attempts by the Aum Shinrikyo to attack
Tokyo with biological weapons,26,27 this supposed puzzle now seems moot. Indeed,
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biological terrorist attacks have been conducted or attempted at many scales. The
following examples illustrate this point and demonstrate the range of incidents over
which surveillance must be effective.
Individuals. In  two members of the Minnesota Patriots Council were convicted
of planning to use the biological toxin ricin to assassinate Internal Revenue Service
agents and a deputy U.S. marshall. In that same year, a member of the white
supremacist organization Aryan Nation was arrested for ordering three vials of freeze-
dried bubonic plague from American Type Culture Collection, a biological supply
house in Rockville, Maryland.28
Assassination Campaigns. Testimony in June  before South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission revealed that the apartheid-era South African
government developed chocolates and cigarettes infected with anthrax, beer bottles
containing botulism, sugar laced with Salmonella, and bottles of cholera culture.
These products were used both for the attempted assassination of specific political
opponents and, perhaps, to cause outbreaks in African National Congress training
camps.41
Workplaces. In , twelve laboratory workers at a large medical center in Texas
developed acute diarrheal illness after eating doughnuts left in their break room that
had been intentionally contaminated with the bacterium Shigella dysenteriae.42
Local Communities. In September , members of an Oregon commune headed by
the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh used Salmonella to contaminate restaurant salad bars
and coffee creamers in The Dalles, the county seat of Wasco County, Oregon.
Although there were no fatalities, some  people became ill, with  requiring
hospitalization. The outbreak strain of Salmonella typhimurium was shown in 
to be the same as a culture of S typhimurium found by an Oregon Public Health
Laboratory official in a clinical laboratory operated by the commune. Two commune
members were indicted in  and later pleaded guilty to conspiring to tamper with
consumer products by poisoning food. The commune members had been testing a
plan to incapacitate voters in preparation for an upcoming election, intending to
influence the outcome by making citizens of The Dalles sick on election day. Public
health authorities had initially rejected the possibility of intentional contamination in
this case, in part because they assumed that terrorists would issue a public statement
in order to create widespread fear, rather than engage in a covert attack.35
Cities—Water Supplies. In , members of a U.S. fascist group called the Order
of the Rising Sun were arrested in possession of  to  kg of typhoid bacteria with
which they planned to contaminate water supplies in Chicago, St. Louis, and other
midwestern U.S. cities.23 It is unlikely such an attack could have been successful, due
to chlorination.39
Cities—Aerosol Release. In the early s, the Aum Shinrikyo released anthrax
bacteria at least twice from a building in eastern Tokyo. 26 Similarly, they sprayed
anthrax in aerosol form from a truck driven around Tokyo, and they released
botulism in a similar manner. None of these attacks appears to have resulted in any
casualties, and it appears that the Aum both failed to breed the most virulent strains
and did not master aerosolization.27
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Attacks on U.S. Military Bases. The Aum Shinrikyo reportedly also sprayed anthrax
from a truck driven past the U.S. naval installation at Yokohama, then by the
headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet at Yokosuka. Again, neither of these
attacks appears to have resulted in any casualties.27
Accidental Releases from Biological Warfare Facilities in the Soviet Union and the
United States. In , an unusual anthrax epidemic occurred in the Soviet city
of Sverdlovsk in the former U.S.S.R. Soviet officials attributed the outbreak to
consumption of contaminated meat, whereas U.S. agencies suspected it to be due to
the accidental release of spores from a military facility located in the city. In 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who in  had been the chief Communist Party
official of the Sverdlovsk region, stated that “the KGB admitted that our military
developments were the cause.” Subsequent analysis of epidemiological data confirmed
that the pathogen had been airborne, and allowed the location and date of escape to
be identified.43
The latter example suggests that international surveillance for biological terrorism
may encounter examples of accidental as well as intentional release. This possibility is
supported by the history of the U.S. biological weapons program. In the U.S., an
offensive biological weapons program was begun in  with research and development
facilities at Camp (later Fort) Detrick, Maryland, testing sites in Mississippi and
Utah, and a production facility in Terre Haute, Indiana. This production facility
lacked adequate engineering safety measures, and tests of the fermentation and
storage processes using nonpathogenic bacteria demonstrated contamination of the
plant and its environs.44
Inspections of biological facilities in Iraq by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) indicate that the Baghdad government cut corners on safety and
biocontainment,28 viewing production workers as expendable. Some governments
may be especially likely to infect their own citizens during weapons development and
production. These examples suggest that unintentional releases of biological agents
may be typical events in a developing biological weapons program. International
surveillance capable of investigating accidental releases (requiring access to sites and
epidemiological data) is therefore important.
RESERVOIRS OF AMBIGUITY
Analysis of clinical samples and/or epidemiological data may allow a distinction to
be made between naturally occurring illness and intentional attack; modern DNA
sequencing techniques should enhance this capability.23 From the public health
standpoint, whether an outbreak is natural or artificial may be of little significance,
though the political or legal ramifications of that distinction could be large.
The inextricable relationship between surveillance for biological terrorism and
surveillance for naturally occurring diseases becomes clear through the consideration
of further examples illustrating the potential difficulty in disentangling natural
outbreaks from certain biological attacks.
Legionnaire’s Disease. In ,  people suddenly contracted pneumonia at an
American Legion convention in Philadelphia, leading to thirty-four deaths. The
bacterium Legionella pneumophila had multiplied in the water tower for the hotel’s
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evaporative cooling system, exposing many guests to an infective dose of the
organism.45 It was later shown that sporadic illnesses in  and an outbreak in 
had in fact been due to “Legionnaire’s Disease” but had not been identified at those
times.46 In both the case of Legionnaire’s Disease and in the outbreak of Hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome in the southwestern U.S. in  (fatal to  percent of those
infected), there was initial concern that the illnesses might be due to criminal or
terrorist attacks.47
Plague in Surat. The  outbreak of pneumonic plague in Surat, India, was
depicted by a cover story in the Indian national newsweekly The Week as being due
to biological warfare experiments conducted by the United States.48 While scientific
refutations are unlikely to be entertained by the most extreme of those making such
accusations, this incident, along with the previously cited domestic U.S. examples,
serves to emphasize the importance of determining that certain outbreaks are not the
results of terrorism.
Intentional Introduction of Diseases Using Natural Vectors. During the Second
World War, the Japanese attacked at least eleven Chinese cities with biological
agents, contaminating food and water supplies with Bacillus anthracis, Vibrio cholerae,
Shigella, Salmonella, and Yersinia pestis. Plague was developed as a weapon by
allowing fleas to feed on plague-infested rats; as many as  million fleas were then
harvested and released from airplanes per attack over Chinese cities.44 More recently,
in  the medical attaché to the French Department of Overseas Territories was
quoted as saying that in Brazil, infectious organisms “were deliberately brought into
Indian territories by landowners and speculators utilizing a mestizo previously
infected,” leading rapidly to the deaths of many Indians, who lacked immunity.
Between  and , the attaché said, outsiders intentionally introduced smallpox,
influenza, tuberculosis, and measles to the tribes of the Mato Grosso region. In 
and , tuberculosis was allegedly intentionally introduced into the northern
section of the Amazon Basin.49
Aum Shinrikyo and Ebola. In , Shoko Asahara, the head of the Aum Shinrikyo,
and some forty followers traveled to Zaire, evidently with the intention of obtaining
samples of the Ebola virus to culture and use in biological attacks.27,40
Foodborne Outbreaks. Diseases borne by domestic and foreign foods kill ,
Americans each year, and sicken millions.50 Almost none of these cases is tracked back
to its cause. Dr. Michael Osterholm, Minnesota’s chief epidemiologist, comments
that, “If you get an outbreak of  people in a state, but no more than a few in any
one household, you’ll never pick it up.”51 The Food and Drug Administration
currently samples less than one percent of the shipments of  billion tons of food
imported annually into the United States. Twelve states have no system for reporting
foodborne disease, largely because of budget restrictions.51,52 It is evident that infectious
organisms could be intentionally introduced into the United States with little
likelihood of detection prior to the food being eaten. Domestic surveillance for food-
borne illnesses is essential not only for tracking natural outbreaks, but for detecting
possible intentional poisonings.
Unexplained Deaths Due to Possible Infectious Causes. The CDC is establishing an
emerging infections program (EIP) network to conduct special population-based
surveillance projects. Four EIP sites, in California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and
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Oregon (covering a population of . million) are conducting surveys of unexplained
deaths and critical illnesses due to possibly infectious causes. The study considers only
individuals between the ages of one and forty-nine who are hospitalized with a critical
illness due to a possibly infectious cause, with no etiology (disease organism responsible)
identified on initial testing. The results of this study are startling. In , 
unexplained deaths due to possible infectious causes (UDPIC) were identified among
previously healthy people in the four sites; these deaths accounted for  percent of all
, deaths among persons one to forty-nine years of age in hospitals and emergency
rooms.46 From  to , laboratory specimens and clinical and epidemiological
data were collected for UDPIC cases in the four regions and examined by CDC. Yet
 percent of these cases remained undiagnosed. Some of these may represent fatal
infections by altogether new pathogens.53
There is evidently a substantial background level of undiagnosed infectious disease in
the United States that could be capable of masking sufficiently subtle and dispersed
terrorism. From the point of view of improving surveillance for biological terrorism,
it is important to recognize that we cannot currently recognize what is causing the
deaths of many Americans from infectious diseases. Improving surveillance for
bioterrorism must begin with the capability to diagnose what is already taking place.
Effective surveillance for biological terrorism requires improved surveillance for
infectious disease.
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PREPARING FOR BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
Preparing for biological terrorism has more in common with confronting emerging
diseases than with preparing for chemical or nuclear attacks. Biological terrorism
will bypass the quick-response teams that would be critical to coping with attacks
using chemical or radioactive materials. Unless a biological attack is announced, or
discovered while still underway, it would not become clear that something was
wrong until victims began to show up in doctors’ offices and hospital emergency
rooms. The disease agents likely to be used as terrorist weapons may incubate for
hours, days, or even weeks before their victims feel any symptoms. More than
likely, the earliest symptoms will mimic those of a bad cold or flu.29,54 Sufficiently
subtle or distributed terrorist attacks may, at least initially, be indistinguishable
from naturally occurring infections or outbreaks. This emphasizes the importance
of training physicians and other health care workers to determine rapidly, on the
basis of the earliest cases, that an unusual infection is involved. Such training is
currently still largely missing.
Because of the incubation delays, no nation can protect itself by simply screening
travelers at its borders. Nor can a country such as the United States hope to inspect
more than a small fraction of the food it imports daily.50,51 As agricultural markets
become increasingly global, the potential vulnerability of nations to food-borne
natural or intentional disease will continue to increase.
Protection against both emerging diseases and biological terrorism must instead rely
on disease surveillance. The synergy between the responses needed to meet these two
threats is a powerful one and the United States and global organizations should take
full advantage of it. Improving public health surveillance for biological terrorism
must have both strong domestic and international components. It also requires better
coordination between public health, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies.
How do we measure success in these endeavors? The success of a strategy of
prevention is invevitably difficult to prove unambiguously. The more successful a
prevention strategy proves to be, the more a metric for success will need to measure
surveillance capabilities rather than response. The absence of an undesired, perhaps
catastrophic, outcome can never be proven to be due to any particular level of
preparedness. Given the importance of prevention, policymakers must become
comfortable with this less direct metric of capabilities. Yet it is, after all, a familiar one
in the national security realm—as familiar as the Cold War strategy of deterrence.
DOMESTIC MEASURES
Because incubation delay periods for many diseases are longer than international
flight travel times, we cannot hope to stop all diseases at the borders of the United
States. Nevertheless, screening and quarantine efforts at ports of entry and inspection
of food imports provide an important component of public health surveillance.
In , the Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology
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(CISET) of the Clinton Administration’s National Science and Technology Council
(NSTC) called for the strengthening of screening and quarantine efforts at ports of
entry into the United States.9 With respect to food safety, the Administration issued
the National Food Safety Initiative,50 which includes improved coverage for imported
foods (as well as for domestic produce, seafood, and livestock). Recognizing the
importance of acting abroad to ensure domestic protection, the Initiative calls for the
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS, within the U.S. Department of Agriculture)
to provide technical assistance to countries whose products are implicated in food-
borne illnesses. These initiatives should improve surveillance for both natural and
artificial outbreaks.
Further improving domestic surveillance requires improving sensitivity and
connectivity along the chain from physicians to national health authorities. We will
consider each link in that chain in turn. First note, however, that it may be unrealistic
to expect domestic public health agencies to find substantial resources to improve
surveillance for biological terrorism within their existing budgets. For example, the
formal mission of the CDC is “To promote health and quality of life by preventing
and controlling disease, injury, and disability”55; its mandate is to provide the greatest
good for public health. It is inevitably difficult to draw resources from programs that
are protecting the lives of Americans from day-to-day life-threatening illnesses and
redirect them to surveillance for future attacks that may or may not ever take place.
Expanding public health surveillance explicitly to include surveillance for biological
terrorism will require new resources.
An announced biological attack, or one discovered while under way, will require first
responders who are appropriately trained. Other biological attacks must first be
recognized by pathologists, physicians, and other health-care personnel in family
practices, clinics, and hospitals. It is important, therefore, that these medical
professionals have some knowledge of the clinical presentations of likely biological
terror agents. There is a broad parallel with actions recommended in the Clinton
Administration’s CISET report9 for addressing emerging diseases. That document
called for expanded formal training and outreach for health-care providers. The
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and CDC have responded by writing to medical
and microbiology associations and other professional organizations urging them to
focus training and certification programs on emerging diseases, and continue to
sponsor meetings on related training needs. Similar actions on the part of NIH and
CDC to raise physicians’ awareness of biological agents should be undertaken. A first
step is the article “Clinical recognition and management of patients exposed to
biological warfare agents”29 in the August , , issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association. However, the best way to ensure that busy physicians improve
their expertise in this area is to require relevant knowledge in medical school curricula
and certification examinations, and to offer appropriate training.
In FY, Congress appropriated $. million to the Department of Defense (DoD)
to implement various domestic preparedness programs. These funds were used in a
variety of ways, including the development of a Chemical-Biological Rapid Response
Team (CBRRT) and to procure additional equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The DoD also began to train
trainers in  U.S. cities to prepare for and respond to emergencies involving
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weapons of mass destruction. By the end of , twenty-seven cities had received
visits.56 The DoD expects to discontinue this training after FY.
Lead agency responsibility for this training should therefore be transferred to the
Public Health Service (PHS). The Federal budget currently devotes some $ billion
annually to unclassified terrorism-related programs.57 It is critical that within this vast
budget, sufficient and ongoing resources be found to train the local physicians and
other first responders to any likely biological attack.
In June , President Clinton requested an additional $ million from Congress
to deter and respond to terrorist incidents involving biological and chemical weapons.58
This request included continued funding for local training programs. The first step in
improving sensitivity for incidents of biological terrorism is for the federal government
to make this a long-term, sustained commitment to training for the nation’s
physicians, pathologists, and other first responders.
Next, regional centers of excellence, building directly on the best state public health
laboratories, should be established with the capability for rapid diagnoses of clinical
samples from within their geographic areas. These regional centers must have the
trained personnel and diagnostic tools necessary to accomplish this mission, and
connections to both local and national institutions must be assured.
To improve the ability to identify rapidly and accurately the early stages of a possible
bioterrorist attack, some six to ten regional sites around the United States should be
designated for substantial improvement in both epidemiological and rapid diagnostic
capabilities. This capability for high-volume rapid diagnostics differs from the
traditional expertise of national reference laboratories. These new regional centers of
excellence should build directly on the best of the state public health laboratories in
order to minimize additional expense. The President’s  request to
Congress58 also asks for an additional $ million to improve the ability of public health
centers to recognize and share information on outbreaks of suspicious diseases.59 This
important request, which if implemented would improve both sensitivity and
connectivity, should be fully funded.
At present, too little attention is being given to developing rapid diagnostics
appropriate to this sort of laboratory setting. For example, state or regional
laboratories will need diagnostics for biological agents that are capable of thousands
of sequential assays. Such diagnostics would not have to be hand-held, and would
not necessarily need to employ cutting-edge technologies. But they would need to
be robust and reliable.
Similar equipment may also be useful for the Army and Naval Research Facilities
overseas; at times of major outbreaks of infectious diseases, these regional reference
labs may be swamped by samples requiring examination. (The Department of
Defense operates infectious disease laboratories in six countries overseas. These labs
conduct epidemiologic investigations, diagnose diseases, and recommend control
measures. They conduct research on diseases of mutual interest to both the host
country and the United States.)9 Whereas high-volume diagnostics might remain
unstressed for long periods in the United States, at reference laboratories overseas
they would more likely be challenged by use in real outbreaks; this could provide a
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valuable opportunity to refine these tools under real conditions. The relevant federal
agencies should ensure that at least one agency is working to meet needs for robust,
rapid, high-volume laboratory diagnostics.
A related requirement, also with resource implications, is to maintain a cadre of
individuals in the United States with expertise in the diseases likely to be employed
by terrorists. For example, at present CDC has the only laboratory in the world that
serves as a reference laboratory for plague. There is only one full-time employee at
that laboratory with experience and training in plague epidemiology and treatment.
The agencies that would be called upon to perform these tasks in the event of
outbreaks of biological warfare agents should complete an inventory of critical
personnel needs. It is unlikely that agencies will contribute additional positions to
individuals with expertise in diseases rarely encountered in the United States. (In
, five cases of plague were reported in the United States, of which two were
fatal; both decedents died before plague was diagnosed.)60 Yet individuals with
training appropriate to most biological warfare agents are important for responding
to outbreaks abroad, since most biological agents are also naturally occurring
diseases in one or another region overseas. Funding and positions should be
provided for sufficient individuals to maintain national expertise in those diseases
likely to be used for biological terrorism.
INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS
Surveillance for disease outbreaks overseas must also be improved. The surest way
to alleviate human suffering, as well as to prevent disease from reaching America’s
shores, is to detect and stop outbreaks quickly while they are still abroad. The
capacities that are needed — trained health care workers and epidemiologists,
regional laboratories with reliable diagnostic equipment, good communications,
and the ability to send in teams of experts —will help spot both emerging diseases,
as well as any outbreaks resulting from the use, testing, or accidental release of
biological agents.
The first step should be to improve the existing international network for the
detection of infectious diseases. There are currently too many geographic holes in the
international disease surveillance system. The World Health Organization (WHO),
the obvious choice for a multilateral solution, has in the recent past been viewed with
skepticism by many experts, due in part to its limited resources. “By the time WHO
realized there was an AIDS epidemic it already existed on four continents. That’s
WHO preparedness and emergency response for you,” commented D.A. Henderson,
the physician who led WHO’s smallpox eradication effort.61
But there is cause for growing optimism. In , the World Health Assembly,
the legislative body of the WHO, adopted a resolution calling on WHO to lead,
strengthen and coordinate international efforts to respond to emerging infectious
diseases. As a result, the Division of Emerging and other Communicable Diseases
Surveillance and Control (EMC) was established, with a mission to strengthen
national and international capacity in the surveillance and control of
communicable diseases.10
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The WHO/EMC publishes in both print and electronic formats the bilingual
English/French Weekly Epidemiological Record and the electronic Disease Outbreak
News. It is also compiling a searchable database of the WHO/EMC collaborating
centers worldwide and, jointly with the World Bank and the Joint UN Programme
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), connecting the collaborating centers electronically.10
Simultaneously, the Program to Monitor Emerging Diseases (ProMED), an
international non-governmental group of infectious disease experts, has established
an electronic reporting system open to unconfirmed reports of disease outbreaks.62
This system parallels the more strongly filtered WHO Rumour Outbreak List.
These steps are reminders of how “connectivity” increasingly means access to
electronic mail and the World Wide Web, and the extent to which international
health security is enhanced when all nations, including developing nations, gain
access to these networks. This is an area where U.S. agencies such as the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) may be especially well placed to provide
technical assistance and support, working together with international agencies and
host governments.
There are two broad categories into which improvements in international surveillance
for bioterrorism may be divided. The first is ongoing “background” surveillance with
the intention of recognizing outbreaks as they occur, while the second involves a
directed response to a specific outbreak that has been detected. These latter cases
remain in the category of surveillance as long as the “response” includes an investigation
whose goal is to identify the nature, extent, and origin of a disease outbreak. By this
definition, the CDC team9 dispatched to the Ebola outbreak in Kikwit, Zaire, in 
was involved in surveillance (in addition to its critical missions of providing medical
care and containing the outbreak).
Investigations of recognized outbreaks (especially those deemed suspicious) and the
ability to identify the responsible organism or strain are critical, but these capabilities
are dependent upon a surveillance system operating in the background that is able to
detect outbreaks as they occur. While egregious attacks or accidents in biological
warfare programs may be difficult to miss, the ability to verify the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and to deter would-be violators is enhanced by
having as sensitive a public health surveillance network as possible, one that will
detect outbreaks that are subtle or identify less-than-subtle outbreaks in their earliest
stages. Moreover, such a network provides the best opportunity to stop an outbreak
before it reaches the United States.
The surest route to such a capability is to improve the international surveillance
system for emerging diseases. In , Vice President Gore announced the Clinton
Administration’s new policy for responding to emerging infectious diseases. Under
that policy, President Clinton directed that the U.S. government would “work with
other nations and international organizations to establish a global infectious disease
surveillance and response system, based on regional hubs and linked by modern
communications technologies.”63
Such new regional networks should be integrated with the five independent
monitoring and alert systems of the WHO/EMC. Information from these systems
are made freely available on the World Wide Web and in other fora. One of these
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systems comprises the WHO Collaborating Centers, a network of over two
hundred laboratories and institutions around the world. Collaborating Centers
carry out specific activities on behalf of WHO and provide information on disease
distribution, while providing laboratory diagnoses and training in the host nation.
Host governments agree to allow the Centers to report directly to WHO, without
first going through the government. However, there are large regions of the world
where these Centers are absent or rare, including Eastern Europe and much of
Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia. The new
regional networks would help fill these gaps.
The CDC has thoroughly examined how to support the development of international
regional networks of closely linked epidemiology and laboratory programs to promote
disease surveillance. These plans were outlined in the  CDC document,
Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United
States.19 In , ProMED had endorsed a system similar to that proposed by the
CDC.64 Ten medical centers, strategically located in the developing world, would
serve as global health sentinels. The centers would be built directly upon the most
capable existing facilities, in order to minimize expense, but would need to be given
priority for international assistance.65 The initial costs for such a network could be
modest, perhaps $ to $ million per year.66 This would represent a small fraction
of the $ billion in unclassified terrorism-related programs the U.S. government
currently spends.57 If the United States wishes to improve global surveillance for
either emerging infectious diseases or incidents of biological terrorism, taking the
lead in developing an international surveillance network is perhaps the most
important commitment it could make.
A proposal for substantially augmenting the global monitoring system65 might also
provide a useful tool in the BWC negotiations. Under Article X of the BWC, States
that are Parties to the Convention “in a position to do so shall also cooperate in
contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations
to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of
bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.”
Augmentation of global surveillance for infectious diseases could be presented as
cooperation under Article X.
One element of the global monitoring system being strengthened by the Division
of Emerging and other Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control (EMC)
provides a model for public health reporting that sidesteps explicit references to
biological agents. The International Health Regulations (IHR) are the only
international public health legislation that requires mandatory reporting of infectious
diseases (cholera, plague, and yellow fever). To transform the IHR into a global alert
system, WHO is revising them to broaden their scope to include many diseases for
which they currently make no provision. The approach is to require notification of
five specific clinical syndromes (respiratory, neurological, antimicrobial resistance,
diarrhoeal, and hemorrhagic). Reports of syndromes will be followed by reporting of
specific diseases once the diagnosis is known, but action can commence even before
a laboratory diagnosis is made.
From the point of view of those concerned with incidents of biological terrorism,
these five syndromes will capture outbreaks due to biological warfare agents as well as
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natural causes. This in turn could provide an appropriate way for regional networks
to de facto participate in surveillance relevant to biological agents without having to
do so explicitly.
THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
A verification regime for the BWC is hampered by the easy availability and dual-use
nature of the microbiological technology needed to culture disease organisms.23,67 In
this light, investigations of unusual or suspicious outbreaks of disease may be the best
option for improving verification.68,69,70 The United States should continue to work
for the right of the global community under the BWC to investigate suspicious
outbreaks wherever they occur. Would-be developers of biological weapons should
fear that if an accidental release occurs, the world may discover the resulting outbreak
and pinpoint its origin. These same investigations may lead to the identification of
unusual but natural outbreaks as well.
The Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (also known as Verification Experts or
VEREX) created by the Third Review Conference for the BWC in  explored
twenty-one different possible verification measures for the BWC, including
surveillance of publications and legislation, scheduled declarations of activities,
remote and on-site inspections, and others. The VEREX concluded that no
combination of measures could be found that would uncover violations with a high
degree of confidence.70,71 A consideration of the demands placed by attempted
verification of the BWC makes it clear why the task is so difficult. For example, sales
estimates of fermenters in the range appropriate for illicit pilot-plant production of
biological agents numbered , in  alone; such plants could be attached to
most major universities or biological firms.67 Because of such practical considerations,
BWC negotiators have narrowed the likely categories of declarable facilities to
biosafety level  laboratories, those facilities producing vaccines or biopesticides, and
military and biodefense programs. Otherwise, the number of sites requiring
verification is just too large.
Moreover, U.S. companies have concerns regarding the protection of industrial
secrets which might be compromised by inspections under a BWC regime. In any
case, the experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq
makes it clear that even comprehensive mandatory declarations and intrusive
challenge inspections of a range of biocapable facilities is insufficient to guarantee
compliance: Iraq developed and maintained a biological weapons capability while
under the direct scrutiny of UN inspectors.70
Investigations of unusual or suspicious outbreaks of disease may therefore be the best
option for improving verification of the BWC. President Clinton endorsed such a
measure in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September .68 In light of
the history of accidental releases in biological weapons programs, a right of
investigation could provide a deterrent to such programs, and a possibility of
detecting violations. The Defense Special Weapons Agency69 has conducted a disease
outbreak exercise that corroborates the utility of on-site epidemiological
investigations in making determinations of the nature of unusual disease outbreaks,
and it has outlined preliminary criteria for recognizing possible biological weapons
events.
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Mechanisms for the initiation of formal on-site epidemiological investigations of
suspicious disease outbreaks are under discussion in ongoing negotiations for a
protocol to the BWC,70 and the United States should place high priority on these
negotiations. Because it is important that health agencies be able to operate overseas
in a transparent manner, directed investigations into suspicious outbreaks are
probably best left to teams specifically organized under the BWC.
A different kind of deterrent stems from some of the same molecular biological
technologies that could facilitate the engineering of improved biological agents.
Genetic fingerprinting (or more broadly, biological signatures tracking: the ability
to identify, distinguish, and establish relationships between particular strains of
organisms through biochemical or molecular biological analyses of those strains, for
example via the development of a library of DNA sequences corresponding to
different strains of viruses and bacteria) would help assure would-be attackers that
even a secret biological release might nevertheless be tracked to its source. Greater
transparency, to include the exchange of strains of organisms held in the national
laboratories of individual nations, could facilitate this goal.72
A DNA-sequence database for different strains of organisms, especially for those
associated with weapons programs, is very important for investigating either domestic
or international outbreaks. Biological signatures tracking and attribution could be a
powerful tool for identifying when an outbreak is artificial and who its perpetrator
might be. Biological signatures tracking and attribution research and development
should receive high priority for continued and additional funding.
IMPROVED COORDINATION WITHIN
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
Coordination between public health and civilian emergency response agencies is
improving. Under the National Food Safety Initiative,50 the four federal agencies
charged with responding to outbreaks of food-borne and water-borne illnesses (the
Food and Drug Administration [FDA], CDC within Health and Human Services
[HHS], the Food Safety and Inspection Service [FSIS] within the U.S. Department
of Agriculture [USDA], and the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]) are
establishing the Food-borne Outbreak Response Coordinating Group (FORCG) to
develop standardized procedures for the rapid exchange of data and information
associated with food-borne illness outbreaks. The HHS, USDA, and EPA will
designate the Assistant Secretary of Health, the Under Secretary for Food Safety, and
the Assistant Administrator for Water, respectively, as their outbreak coordinators.
However, public health surveillance, both domestic and international, could also be
improved through better coordination among public health and law enforcement73
and intelligence agencies. Coordination is inhibited because of the conflicting
demands created by the transparency required for public health agencies to operate
freely in the United States or abroad, and the requirements of law enforcement or
intelligence gathering. Consider, for example, an institution such as a hospital or
university that experiences a disease outbreak. Personnel and administrators may
talk freely to scientists pursuing a public health mission, but may be much less
forthcoming if those investigators are perceived as surrogates for law enforcement
agencies which could pursue possible prosecutions. Internationally, the situation is
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even more delicate. After the  plague outbreak in Surat, for example, the Indian
newsweekly The Week explicitly accused the United States of being responsible for the
outbreak and identified by name four members of the CDC who had arrived in India
to study it. The CDC’s desire to send epidemiologists was described as suspicious.48
U.S. agencies conducting epidemiological or other public health activities, be they
civilian or military, will be understandably reluctant to risk compromising their
ability to detect and respond to diseases overseas by appearing to have ties with
intelligence gathering or covert activities.
Nevertheless, the threat of biological terrorism, and potential early ambiguities
between natural outbreaks and intentional or accidental releases of biological agents,
demand that closer ties between law enforcement, intelligence, and public health be
established. For example, public health surveillance could likely benefit from domestic
and international intelligence that there was a probable biological threat and consequent
concern over the potential use of a particular biological agent. Conversely, law
enforcement and intelligence could benefit from being regularly informed on what
outbreaks are being seen in public health surveillance (domestic and overseas) and
how these events are being resolved.
Federal law enforcement has considerable experience working with local actors
(such as local police departments) and success at maintaining the confidentiality of
appropriate information passed on in these relationships. The appropriate levels and
individuals in the public health surveillance system to receive analogous information
need to be determined. Maintenance of confidentiality could be inconsistent with a
very broad notification. For this sort of exchange of information to be secure and
effective, pre-planning is a requirement.
A ROLE FOR SCIENTISTS AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES
Scientists have in the past alerted the public and decision-makers to dilemmas
posed by their research, for example in the s during the recombinant DNA
controversy.74 Zilinskas75 has suggested that, given the difficulties in verifying the
BWC,67 individual scientists and scientific societies must cultivate an ethic in which
the illicit development of biological weapons will be discouraged and perhaps revealed
to outsiders. He recommends that scientists in nations suspected of sponsoring
biological weapons research be especially encouraged to attend scientific meetings and
provided with electronic communications access to their international colleagues.
Similarly, science students from these nations should be invited to international fora
where scientific ethics are discussed. National and international scientific societies
such as the American Society for Microbiology and the International Council of
Scientific Unions are natural sponsors for such activities. Moreover, scientific and
technical workers who once worked in biological weapons programs, for example in
the former Soviet Union,25 should be provided with challenging work in their home
nations so as to deter them from marketing their biological weapons skills abroad.
International programs established by the European Union, Japan, the United States,
and private individuals, such as the International Science and Technology Center,
should be supported with these objectives in mind.
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CONCLUSION: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Terrorist attacks using biological weapons have been carried out or attempted at
virtually every scale, from individual assassinations to indiscriminate attacks. While
apocalyptic urban attacks have not succeeded, they have been attempted by at least
one terrorist group. Prudent national security policy requires the United States to
prepare itself for such attacks.
Because diseases have long incubation times when compared to modern national and
international travel times, preparing for biological terrorism is necessarily different
from preparing for attacks using other weapons of mass destruction. Preparing for
bioterrorism requires improving the sensitivity and “connectivity” of public health
surveillance systems within the United States and overseas. Domestically, physicians
and other health care workers must be given the training needed to recognize or at
least suspect unusual diseases, and the ability to check these suspicions quickly at the
state or regional level must be available. Internationally, the United States should
work with foreign governmental, multilateral, and non-governmental organizations
to improve global surveillance for suspicious outbreaks. These same systems will also
help protect American citizens, and people throughout the world, from emerging
diseases.
The incubation delay periods of many diseases as well as the growing amount of food
imported into the United States demonstrate the insufficiency of protecting the
security of U.S. citizens through monitoring for human-borne illnesses at ports of
entry or inspection of food imports. Both forms of monitoring are important and
should be improved, but some diseases will inevitably elude this screening. There is
no alternative to a defense in depth, with improved surveillance at all levels, from the
local to the international. The United States has a strong stake in determining the
nature and origin of outbreaks overseas. Threatening outbreaks are best recognized
and stopped while still abroad.
An important component of such international detection and response will
continue to be the dispatching of epidemiological and medical teams overseas.
However, international surveillance must primarily rely upon multilateral
cooperation, in the form of both sentinel laboratories and formal and informal
electronic and voice networks. It is therefore directly in the interest of the United
States to strengthen these.
Preparations for a biological attack via improved public health surveillance, both
domestic and international, will simultaneously protect U.S. citizens against emerging
infections and other naturally occurring outbreaks. Even if a major biological terrorist
attack never occurs, the investment in public health will, on a daily basis, work to
improve the health of all Americans.
It is sobering that many of these conclusions are reiterations of lessons learned decades
ago. In , soon after the onset of the Korean War, it was recognized that a
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biological terrorist attack within the United States was possible, and that little could
be done to stop such an attack. However, the disease could be contained and quickly
treated if early detection were achieved. To this end, the CDC’s Epidemic
Intelligence Service (EIS) was formed; medical officers were trained in field
epidemiology and assigned to the CDC, state health departments, and universities.76
In the absence of a terrorist attack, members of the EIS could maintain their expertise
and improve American public health by analyzing natural disease outbreaks. These
baseline assessments would in any case be important for the recognition of possible
attacks, as they would be needed to determine whether an outbreak exceeded normal
background levels—and was therefore potentially suspicious.
An appropriate national security response to the threat of biological terrorism is
interwoven with the response that is needed to combat the environmental threat of
emerging diseases: improved public health surveillance. In this context, responsibility
for national security extends throughout society, from primary care physicians at local
hospitals and clinics, to state and national health laboratories and officials, and to
public health surveillance networks overseas. These responsibilities need to be matched
with appropriate resources. Public health and national security merge in the realm of
emerging diseases and biological terrorism.
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